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NAMING RIGHTS: ATTRIBUTION AND LAW 
 
Rebecca Tushnet* 
 
When I agreed to write a piece on copyright reform for this symposium, I 
intended to propose an attribution right for authors of copyrighted (or even once-
copyrighted) works. As I struggled to define the scope of this right, however, I 
realized that I was unable to formulate a satisfying legal regime to enforce what I 
believe are moral requirements of giving credit to authors. Legitimate claims for 
credit are simply too varied and contextual, and copyright law already too complex 
and reticulated, for an attribution right to be a valuable addition to copyright’s 
arsenal. This is so even though voluntary attribution is often a viable substitute for 
more expansive control of uses of copyrighted works. 
The reflections that follow therefore make the case against sweeping 
legislative change, despite the existence of powerful and well-reasoned arguments 
for a greater legal role for attribution. Fundamentally, American copyright law has 
enough trouble identifying owners; identifying authors is beyond its grasp. 
Attribution rights, especially in the absence of comprehensive author-centered 
reform, would only make the law more complex, not more just. I conclude by 
examining the role of attribution in more modest proposals to add a new fair use 
factor and to add protections for uses of “orphan works,” works whose owners 
cannot be found after a reasonable search. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT ROLE OF ATTRIBUTION 
 
A.  The Absence of Attribution from U.S. Law 
 
Despite the international obligations of the United States,1 current copyright 
law provides only minimal direct protection for authors’ rights to be recognized as 
authors of particular works. The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) creates an 
attribution right for limited-edition works of visual art,2 but it excludes mass-
market visual art, movies, books, music, and other major categories of creative 
works, and is subject to other important limitations that make it largely irrelevant 
to the vast majority of creative works.3 The provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) create some attribution-like rights by providing special 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Julie Cohen, 
Sonia Katyal, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Zachary Schrag, and Jessica Silbey for comments. 
1
 The Berne Convention, of which the United States is a signatory, provides for 
attribution rights for authors. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 
1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
2
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
3
 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension 
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992–93 (2006). 
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protections for “copyright management information” (CMI), but the legal rules 
governing CMI are explicitly geared at deterring infringement of the copyright 
owner’s economic rights, not the creator’s moral rights.4 Current case law 
“suggest[s] that the CMI provisions have not been particularly efficacious or well-
drafted.”5 
Generally, authors who want attribution must depend on whatever economic 
leverage they have or on norms of citation. Where there is no contractual 
relationship between an author and a user—for example, in cases of fair use, 
statutory licenses, or statutory exceptions to copyright rights—there is no way for 
an author to demand a separate attribution right. When the author lacks economic 
leverage, as individual creators often do when negotiating with large corporations, 
she is unlikely to be able to retain attribution rights. In many cases, the individual 
creator’s work may be a work for hire, leaving her with no rights that copyright 
will recognize. 
Though it presents an unusual set of facts, the metamorphosis of O.J. 
Simpson’s recent autobiography illustrates the significance of the 
authorship/ownership divide. Simpson, with assistance from another writer, 
penned If I Did It (referring to the double murder of which he was acquitted at a 
criminal trial, but for which he was held liable at a subsequent civil trial). Because 
of the outstanding civil judgment against him, he lost control of the rights to the 
Goldman family, which had the cover redesigned to obscure the If; added a 
subtitle, Confessions of the Killer; removed Simpson’s name from the cover; and 
added disparaging commentary.6 In a moral rights jurisdiction, this would violate 
several of Simpson’s inalienable rights, but in the U.S., it was just another example 
of an owner’s ability to control a work. 
The overall American legal landscape, then, is unfavorable to attribution 
rights in copyright. Attribution is incidental and largely customary. Instead, control 
over the copyrighted material has primacy of place. Occasionally control is 
replaced by compensation, a right to be paid for certain uses even when the 
copyright owner cannot prohibit them, such as the compulsory license for 
reproductions of musical works or compulsory cable retransmission licenses. 
Various proposals have been offered for increasing the role of compulsory 
                                                 
4
 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202. Removal of CMI is only actionable if it facilitates copyright 
infringement. See id. § 1202(b). Altering the name of the author (who need not even be 
named in the CMI, since the author’s name is only one potential type of CMI) without 
making infringement more likely does not violate the law. See id. § 1202(b)–(c).  
5
 Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 41, 70 (2007).  
6
 See Timothy Noah, O.J. Is Still Beating His Wife, SLATE, Aug. 30, 2007, 
http://www. slate.com/id/2173030. In fact, on Amazon.com, the Goldman Family is listed 
as the author. See Amazon.com, If I Did It: Confessions of the Killer, http://www.amazon. 
com (search “books” for “If I Did It”; then follow “If I Did It” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 
28, 2007). 
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licenses, shifting the balance from control to compensation.7 But credit, a term I 
will use interchangeably with attribution, is still a distant third in law. 
 
B.  Attribution’s Proponents 
 
In recent years, attribution has received sustained attention from copyright 
scholars and activists, in part because of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,8 which sharply limited the 
ability of authors to use trademark law to control attribution of copyrighted works. 
Dastar held that the Lanham Act’s prohibition of false designations of “origin” 
refers only to the physical origin of a product, not to the origin of the expression or 
ideas contained therein. Thus, “[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, 
once a copyright has expired . . . ‘passes to the public.’”9 Before Dastar, an author 
could often assert a right over the use or omission of his name on a copyrighted 
work, even if he had transferred the copyright, on the ground that the use or 
omission deceptively allocated credit for the work. After Dastar, this control is 
only possible, if at all, in circumstances where there is a deceptive 
misrepresentation in advertising or promotion that is material to consumers.10 
Despite Dastar and the absence of robust attribution rights in copyright law, 
powerful pro-attribution norms exist throughout modern American society. Both 
authors and audiences generally accept that attribution is important to authors, and 
that false attribution, especially plagiarism, is a moral wrong.11 As Jane Ginsburg 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199–258 (2004) (discussing possibilities for expanded 
compulsory licensing in the digital age); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish 
Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 339, 347 
(2006) (suggesting that copyright should shift its focus from control to compensation); 
Mark Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786 (2007) (arguing that liability or compensation rules should 
sometimes apply to unauthorized uses of copyrighted works); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 31 (2003) (offering a compulsory licensing proposal somewhat different 
from Fisher’s). 
8
 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
9
 Id. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)). 
10
 See id. at 38 (stating that false advertising claims for misattribution under 
§ 43(a)(1)(B) remain available). But see Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, 
PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that Dastar bars false advertising 
claims concerning authorship). 
11
 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 
54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 175 (2002) (discussing attribution norms as moral obligations); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 155 (Spring 2007). 
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writes, “few interests seem as fundamentally intuitive as that authorship credit 
should be given where credit is due.”12 
To address this mismatch between morality and law, scholars have set forth 
various proposals for recognizing attribution rights. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, for 
example, proposes an attribution right covering (1) actual use or substantial 
reproduction of an author’s original work without attribution or with false 
attribution, (2) “modification of an author’s work resulting in a substantially 
similar version to the original without attribution or with false attribution,” and (3) 
“false attribution of authorship of a work to an author.”13 She would also add a 
limited integrity right in cases of (1) “objectionable modifications” to the work or 
(2) public use of the original work, or a close copy, “in a context deemed 
objectionable by the author” when “the work is either expressly attributed to the 
original author, or absent attribution, still likely to be recognized as the original 
author’s work.”14 In such cases, the user would be required to add a disclaimer 
“adequate to inform the public of the author’s objection to the modification or 
contextual usage.”15 Kwall's recommendation regarding integrity is more of a 
disclaimer remedy or reverse attribution right rather than a traditional integrity 
right, as the latter would allow the author to suppress an objectionable use 
entirely.16 
Proposals for attribution rights receive support from two often-clashing 
groups of copyright theorists. First, copyright low-protectionists (like me) think 
that copyright’s control rights have metastasized, harming creativity and access to 
creative works. Low-protectionists favor attribution as a substitute for expansive 
economic rights in copyrighted works.17 For example, most Creative Commons 
licenses grant to the world many rights of reuse, but include as the key default term 
an attribution requirement. The basic presumption is that uncompensated and 
uncontrolled uses are legitimate as long as credit remains attached. In other 
countries, fair dealing exceptions to copyright allow certain news and educational 
                                                 
12
 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and 
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 264 (2004). 
13
 Kwall, supra note 3, at 2004. 
14
 Id. at 2006. 
15
 Id. 
16
 I thank Professor Kwall for her discussions with me on this point. 
17
 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the 
“Grey Album,” 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 53–54) (suggesting 
attribution rights and disclaimers as replacements for the derivative works right in most 
cases); Lastowka, supra note 5, at 62 (praising the incentive function of attribution); 
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 47 (1996) 
(“[A]ny adaptation, licensed or not, should be accompanied by a truthful disclaimer and a 
citation or hypertext link to an unaltered copy of the original. That suffices to safeguard the 
work’s integrity, and protects our cultural heritage, but it gives copyright owners no 
leverage to restrict access to public domain materials by adding value and claiming 
copyright protection for the mixture.”); Tushnet, supra note 11. 
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use, conditioned on appropriate attribution.18 An attribution rule has also been 
proposed as a quid pro quo for allowing people to copy orphan works. Most 
proponents of a special rule facilitating use of orphan works accept unhesitatingly 
that attribution is the least (and often the most) we owe known-but-unreachable 
authors.19 
Second, authorial high-protectionists, who believe that authors should in 
general be able to control most uses of their works, also favor attribution rights, 
often as part of a greater package of moral rights.20 These high-protectionists 
object to the complete commodification of copyrighted works, but not on the same 
grounds as low-protectionists. Rather, full commodification (including the ultimate 
in alienability, the work for hire) interferes with the dignity and integrity of the 
unique relationship between the author and her creations. Attribution rights, in this 
view, would protect creators from exploitation and bad bargains; they would not 
necessarily require or facilitate any retrenchment in copyright’s control or 
compensation rights. 
The strange bedfellows of this consensus find themselves borrowing from 
each other’s copyright theories. Low-protectionists, who often put the public 
interest over authors’ interests, nevertheless offer attribution rights as a matter of 
fairness to authors.21 Meanwhile, a growing literature focuses on a third, 
consumer-oriented rationale for attribution rights, treating authorship as a type of 
trademark and thus a consumer-protection device.22 High-protectionists are often 
                                                 
18
 The Berne Convention provides for exceptions to copyright for such uses, but 
requires attribution. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, arts. 10(2)–(3), 10bis(1). 
19
 See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT 
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 110–11 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT ON ORPHAN 
WORKS], available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.  
20
 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artists 
Rights Act Got It Wrong, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 741, 743–44; Kwall, supra note 3, at 1972–
75. 
21
 Jennifer Rothman, for example, though highly critical of the role that custom plays 
in many areas of intellectual property law, singles out attribution-related customs as 
legitimate for courts to consider. Attribution customs, she argues, are aspirational and 
normative claims about justice toward authors, rather than simply adopted to avoid 
litigation, and thus can properly be accorded legal weight. Jennifer Rothman, The 
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2007) (manuscript at 47–48, 50). 
22
 See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, 
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005) [hereinafter 
Heymann, Birth of the Authornym]; Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of 
Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2005); cf. Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The 
Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 63 (2006) (analyzing attribution as 
valuable information in employment relationships). Laura Heymann advocates taking 
attribution rights out of copyright entirely and treating them as trademark claims, with 
disclaimers being an appropriate remedy, in order to limit copyright to protecting authors’ 
economic interests. Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. 
REV. 55, 61–62 (2007) [hereinafter Heymann, Trademark/Copyright]. 
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willing to sign on to consumer interests as an extra justification for attribution 
rights, because proper attribution allows readers to identify the types of works in 
which they would prefer to invest their time, attention, and money.23 The 
consumer-protection justification for attribution may be attractive to high-
protectionists insofar as it casts readers and viewers as generalized “users” and 
“consumers,” groups whose moral claims to appropriate and interpret creative 
works may seem far inferior to those of authors.24 Trademark-style consumer 
protectionism differs from low-protectionism in copyright both in the definition of 
the protected class (consumers making rational choices in a marketplace versus 
audiences desiring access to works that are important parts of culture) and in the 
interests to be protected (quality of information about particular works versus 
quantity, although low-protectionists believe that quantity offers each person an 
opportunity to satisfy her unique tastes and thus provides quality as well). 
The emerging consensus is that attribution serves both authors and audiences, 
rather than forcing a tradeoff between their interests.25 In this view, credit, unlike 
control and compensation, poses no difficulty of balancing incentives for creation 
versus access to already-created work. 
 
II.  CREDIT IN CONTEXT 
 
Attribution’s proponents make many good points about the important work 
done by proper credit in rewarding authors and informing consumers. As Catherine 
Fisk has documented, attribution norms are widespread across many endeavors, 
from academia to moviemaking to advertising firms, indicating a robust consensus 
that attribution is an important moral and economic value. 26 Yet, the particulars of 
how credit is earned vary substantially. The difficult problems arise in integrating a 
legal attribution right into the existing copyright scheme.27 Because there are 
                                                 
23
 See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective 
on the Moral Right of “Paternity”?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379, 381–82 (2005); 
Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 269–70. Ginsburg is clear, however, that moral rights trump 
trademark principles, which might otherwise focus on owners rather than authors. See id. at 
388–89 (arguing that trademark concepts have to be modified in the authorship context to 
honor individual creators’ attribution rights, which belong to them as a matter of moral 
desert); cf. Kwall, supra note 20, at 745 (arguing that trademark analogies do not recognize 
the proper author-centered rationales for attribution rights). 
24
 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 
U.S.A. 1 (1997). Ginsburg, in the course of arguing for the primacy of authors over users, 
puts the phrase “user rights” in quotes, “because ‘rights,’ of course, is a loaded term,” id. at 
2, but she is less concerned with the connotations of “users.” 
25
 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 306–07; Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1174. 
26
 See Fisk, supra note 22, at 76–101. 
27
 As explained supra note 22, Laura Heymann would convert attribution rights into 
trademark rights. Many of my objections would apply as readily to credit-as-trademark as 
to credit-for-copyright. For example, parceling out credit can be extremely contentious 
with respect to multiply-authored or derivative works. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
Heymann argues that her proposal avoids this problem because trademark is not about 
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powerful attribution norms throughout modern society, rather than a single norm 
that covers most situations, any attribution law is likely to be extremely vague, 
which punts the problem of identifying when and what attribution is required to 
individual cases. This generates legal uncertainty in an area that hardly needs more 
uncertainty. The following sections explore these problems with moving from 
norms to legal regulation. 
 
A.  Classification Difficulties 
 
The threshold problem is determining which copyrightable works should be 
granted attribution rights. Even highly moralistic copyright regimes limit the types 
of works deemed worthy of moral rights. Computer programs, for example, have 
so many utilitarian functions that moral rights would be incompatible with general 
social welfare. As a result, moral-rights theorists are less interested in bringing 
computer programs within the subject matter of moral rights.28 Part of the project 
of defining an attribution right is to identify appropriate subsets of copyrightable 
works for which attribution rights should be available.29 Again, there are possible 
                                                                                                                            
identifying the source of individual components of a product. Instead, trademark is a 
system for attributing responsibility to a particular source, and she would not recognize any 
attribution right unless there was consumer confusion about who authorized a particular 
work. See Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22, at 1442–43. But multiple 
entities can authorize a single product, just as multiple entities can endorse a single 
political candidate. In my view, credit-as-trademark would increase the pressure on courts 
to find “trademark uses” and consumer confusion about authorization everywhere, 
including in cases where an artistic work is in the background of a picture or movie. I will 
focus here, however, on copyright-oriented attribution proposals. For a discussion of an 
early version of Heymann’s proposal, see 43(B)log, Works in progress: Laura Heymann, 
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2006/10/works-in-progress-laura-heymann.html (Oct. 8, 2006, 
10:36 EST). 
28
 See, e.g., Ian Eagles & Louise Longdin, Technological Creativity and Moral 
Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 209 (2004) (discussing and 
criticizing the exclusion of computer programs and similar works from existing moral 
rights schemes). The objections to moral rights center on interference with economic 
exploitation of works that are highly functional or generally require substantial corporate 
and collective investment. Attribution rights seem easier to extend to such works than 
rights against distortion, rights of withdrawal, or others that plainly threaten to take a work 
or a derivative work entirely off the market. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 301 (an 
attribution right in the United States should cover all copyrightable works). Notably, open-
source licenses generally involve attribution to contributors, suggesting that credit serves 
important functions for computer programmers, as it does for other types of authors. See 
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 52 J. INDUS. ECON. 
197, 212–17 (2002) (discussing the economic and reputational benefits for programmers of 
being identified as participating in open-source projects). 
29
 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2007) (arguing that only works meeting a heightened standard of 
originality should be given moral rights; this would involve excluding certain categories of 
works entirely as well as evaluating specific works within protectable categories). 
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producer- and consumer-oriented classifications. Taking the author’s perspective, 
we could grant attribution rights where we conclude that attribution is generally an 
important part of the connection between author and creation.30 Or, taking the 
audience’s perspective, we could grant attribution rights where attribution is likely 
to be significant to the audience’s perception or valuation of the resulting work. 
Either way, we would be endorsing particular cultural conceptions about when 
attribution matters.31 
This classification project seems to me highly dubious. I can imagine many 
situations in which attribution is much more important to a computer 
programmer’s life goals and plans than a painter’s,32 and many situations in which 
audiences care more about the identity of the programmer than the painter. Here, 
however, I take for granted that an attribution right might be limited to certain 
categories within copyrightable subject matter, excluding most utilitarian or 
corporately created works, whether for principled or practical reasons. Even after 
making this cut, I will argue, attribution rights would have immense difficulty 
recognizing and conforming to vital contextual differences. 
Traditional literary and visual works, for example, would be at the core of any 
attribution right, yet a legal code of attribution would fit poorly with the practices 
of reference and quotation that pervade these forms. 
A recent work offers an object lesson: Jonathan Lethem's essay The Ecstasy of 
Influence: A Plagiarism.33 At the end of the piece, he reveals that his words are in 
fact copied from a variety of other sources, quotations mixed and mashed. He 
provides sources at the end, but not in a conventional format; it is difficult to tell 
which words came from where. In the context of a passionate argument against 
control over creative works, the absence of attribution serves as part of Lethem’s 
                                                 
30
 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 301–02 (arguing that all human authors and 
performers should have attribution rights, regardless of work-for-hire status). 
31
 The idea of limiting attribution rights to particular authors adopts a culturally 
specific notion about authorship, and may enhance the problem of disregarding cultural 
traditions from which individual authors have drawn. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 22, at 55–
56 (“Attribution appears to operate quite differently within traditional or indigenous 
cultures than it does in modern American or European culture. Notions of individual 
authorship, the status that comes from being perceived as a creator, and the norms that 
govern attribution vary among cultures . . . . It is interesting to note that as indigenous or 
non-western cultural practices, information, and artifacts are appropriated by American or 
European culture, vague attribution is sometimes made (to highlight the exoticness or 
authenticity of the borrowed bit of culture), but often it is not. The power disparities in such 
cultural appropriation are enormous . . . .”) (footnote omitted). Gender also plays an 
important role in determining who is deemed entitled to credit. See id. at 58 (“Women have 
long provided uncredited research, editorial, and technical assistance on creative projects 
undertaken by the men in their lives. Who can and should be credited with invention is thus 
culturally specific and wrapped up as much in norms about honor and credit as in the 
supposedly simple fact of who conceived a new idea.”). 
32
 Catherine Fisk points out that open-source programmers have created elaborate 
schemes for ensuring proper attribution. See Fisk, supra note 22, at 88. 
33
 HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Feb. 2007, at 61. 
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claims: We read the essay because of Lethem’s reputation as a writer, Harper’s 
reputation as a magazine, and Lethem’s skill in deploying (others’) words. 
Attribution would destroy the flow of the piece and would also disconnect the 
words from Lethem’s endorsement of them, just as a President’s acknowledgment 
that a speechwriter wrote his addresses would distract audiences from the critical 
fact that he was speaking in all relevant respects for himself. (One might respond 
that Lethem’s quotations are classic fair use, but attribution rights proposals 
generally include fair uses.34) 
Larry Lessig, copyright law’s most prominent low-protectionist, was one of 
the people whose words were appropriated. In a letter to Harper’s, he praised 
Lethem’s sentiment, but objected to Lethem’s unattributed copying of “the only 
sentence I have ever written that I truly like.”35 Lessig wanted attribution where he 
would never dream of seeking control—a perfectly consistent position for a 
Creative Commons supporter. Lethem’s response, however, pointed out that 
nonfiction has citation standards distinct from those of other creative forms: 
 
Artists are, among other things, mischievous, and we should try to 
remember that we wish them to be. In songs, films, paintings, and much 
poetry, allusions and even direct quotations . . . are subsumed within the 
voice of the artist who claims them. Citations come afterward, if at all. 
There are no quotation marks around the elements in a Robert 
Rauschenberg collage or around Quentin Tarantino’s swipes from lesser-
known movies. And T.S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land” has only end-notes—
which, I suspect, are much less often read than the poem itself.36  
 
Or, as a recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) report states more dryly, “In a multi-media environment with mixes of 
text, video, and graphic works, concepts such as ‘citation’ may be blurry.”37 What 
works for quotations in standard educational and news reporting uses may not 
work in other forms of reuse, even within the same medium. The fact that practices 
surrounding attribution are widely varied even within particular cultures makes an 
                                                 
34
 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 303 (stating that “fair use and other statutory 
exceptions should not supply a defense” to a violation of the attribution right); Lastowka, 
supra note 5 (proposing to make attribution part of the fair use test). 
35
 Lawrence Lessig, Letter to the Editor, Credit Where Credit’s Due, HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE, Apr. 2007, at 4. Lessig declines to identify the sentence. 
36
 Jonathan Lethem, Letter, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Apr. 2007, at 5. For a recently 
litigated example of art without quotation marks, see Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). Koons incorporated a portion of 
Blanch’s fashion photograph into a painting, and as part of his successful fair use defense 
argued that it was important to his artistic message to appropriate the “anonymous” legs in 
Blanch’s photo. Id. at 481. 
37
 Directorate for Sci., Tech. and Indus., Comm. for Info., Computer and Commc’ns 
Policy, Working Party on the Info. Econ., DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/FINAL 46 (Apr. 12, 
2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf. 
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attribution right difficult to define in advance, and thus onerous for compliance 
purposes.38 
Consider also relatively recent information about Nabokov’s Lolita. What 
good would it do us for Nabokov to interrupt the narrative in order to tell us that 
he’d been inspired by a short story published in Germany, whose plot and 
characters have notable similarities to those of his masterpiece?39 This information 
is plainly of interest to scholars tracing the anxiety of influence, or perhaps the 
anxiety of forgetting. That does not mean that the ordinary reader would find her 
understanding of Nabokov’s work enhanced. Nabokov has suffered no diminution 
in reputation since this revelation, even though he could be judged to have violated 
both the original author’s attribution and integrity rights. Many people think that 
Nabokov created a work of genius, and this excuses much. When it comes to 
plagiarism, as opposed to copyright infringement, many readers follow an older 
rule: improvement on the original is not wrong.40 Attribution might even muddy 
the waters, making it more difficult to credit Nabokov for the brilliance he added 
to an otherwise unremarkable concept. 
The broader issue raised by Nabokov’s example is the idea/expression 
distinction. Plagiarism is often charged when a writer, especially a student, fails to 
attribute the source of her ideas. But copyright does not protect ideas, only original 
                                                 
38
 Another example: Catherine Fisk describes the rise of attribution norms at 
newspapers that require not just credit for the main writer of a story, but also for “stringers” 
who contributed research or parts of the story. This contrasts with the norms of broadcast 
journalism, where writers, researchers, and others off screen are rarely credited, perhaps 
because voluminous credits would cut into valuable advertising time. Fisk suggests that the 
main reason for fewer credits is that viewers’ expectations about authorship and credit 
differ between broadcast and print journalism, expectations that themselves are likely 
related to the economic structures of the different media. See Fisk, supra note 22, at 92–93. 
39
 See Lolita: A tale by Heinz von Lichberg, http://www.arlindo-correia.com/ 
lolita_de.html (July 24, 2004) (“[A]dmirers of Vladimir Nabokov and scholars of modern 
literature were startled by the revelation that the Lolita of Nabokov’s great novel was not 
the first fictional nymphet of that name to have enchanted an older lover: her namesake had 
appeared in an eighteen-page tale, also called “Lolita,” by the obscure German author 
Heinz von Lichberg, published in 1916.”). 
40
 See generally MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT, 
AND POWER 154 (2001) (“All agree, it would seem, that imitation is acceptable if changes, 
usually deemed ‘improvements,’ are effected on the original text or idea.”) 
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expression.41 Proponents of a right to attribution for expression only have already 
uncoupled law from the norms that supposedly justify a legal remedy.42 
An obvious defense of attribution rights against this critique is that line-
drawing is part of the judicial enterprise, and is certainly familiar in copyright 
cases. If copyright recognizes “thin” and “thick” variants, and inquires on a case-
by-case basis into whether useful articles’ creative features are conceptually 
separable from their utilitarian functions, it can certainly evaluate particular works 
for whether attribution is required either to respect an original artist or to 
accurately inform a potential audience.43 A court could evaluate the sufficiency of 
T.S. Eliot’s endnotes, looking for evidence of how readers used them to allocate 
credit. Another court could mandate that Tarantino add citations to the end credits 
of his films, preserving their flow but identifying the obscure sources of his 
inspiration. 
This would be a very bad idea. The fact that rights thickets already exist is no 
reason to make them thicker and pricklier.44 Moreover, experience with attribution 
rights in other jurisdictions does not show that they would work well here. This is 
because the American copyright system is in many ways an outlier and because 
Americans are often willing to sue when, in other systems, the conflict would be 
resolved outside the judicial system.45 I am not aware of a non-U.S. case similar to 
                                                 
41
 It is also relevant that people often overestimate the originality of their ideas, and 
believe they deserve credit when they do not, or do not deserve very much—as the source 
of Nabokov’s inspiration deserves little credit for Lolita. Two authors of cookbooks aimed 
at picky children, for example, are presently involved in a dispute over whether one “stole” 
the idea from the other—but the idea itself was already known. See Steven A. Shaw, Not 
That There’s Anything Wrong With That: Jessica Seinfeld’s Cookbook Is Unoriginal, But 
It’s Not Plagiarism, SLATE, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2176563/. 
42
 See Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1233–34 (distinguishing anti-plagiarism norms, 
which cover ideas and small snippets of verbatim copying, from his proposed attribution 
right, which would not cover those things). 
43
 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 299, 304 (arguing that an attribution right should 
follow the example of Australia’s multifactor tests, including reference to industry norms 
as one among many considerations in evaluating whether omission of attribution was 
reasonable); Heymann, Trademark/Copyright, supra note 22, at 60–61 (arguing that the 
practical difficulties of attribution are similar to other problems in intellectual property 
law); Kwall, supra note 29, manuscript at 21 (accepting the necessity of line-drawing in 
attribution rights). 
44
 No matter how mechanical an attribution regime would be in theory, as long as it 
did not replace any existing rights, it would necessarily add complexity to the current 
system. Moreover, even a mechanical, CMI-type attribution right of the kind Ginsburg 
discusses, see Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 304, would be difficult if not impossible for 
amateur creators to implement. Especially given the vast amount of existing material that is 
not digitally tagged with appropriate author information, the creator of a mash-up or parody 
would have a devilish time complying with new attribution rules. 
45
 One reason for this, as my colleague Julie Cohen pointed out, is that many other 
jurisdictions require the losing party to pay the victor’s attorney fees, which makes 
litigation a riskier prospect than the standard American rule in which each side bears its 
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Choe v. Fordham University School of Law,46 in which a disgruntled student sued 
a law journal under the Lanham Act for marring his note with capitalization and 
typographical errors, erroneous footnote cross-references, and extra words.47 
Attribution rights may seem easier to manage than other moral rights because 
all they require is proper disclosure. Thus, rather than suppressing works entirely, 
attribution rights simply enforce labeling rules. This proposition assumes that 
authors will never over assert their rights in order to suppress unwanted uses 
completely, and that users will understand and assert their rights to proceed once 
they have conformed their attributions to the law. Those assumptions are 
unwarranted. The most detailed proposals for new attribution rights provide for 
damages, either generally48 or at least under some circumstances such as willful 
misattribution, actual economic harm, or violations that are fully completed so that 
injunctive relief would be useless.49 Given the standard practice of sending cease 
and desist letters phrased in aggressive terms, we can expect that some authors will 
always claim that those circumstances apply when they allege violation of an 
attribution right. As a result, users will routinely be threatened with substantial 
monetary penalties, and legitimate behavior will be chilled.50 
Yet even setting aside chilling effects, disclosure is an insufficient remedy for 
misattribution. The next section discusses why the apparently happy compromise 
of disclosure without suppression will not work. 
 
B.  The Fine Print 
 
Many proponents of an attribution right accept that, in general, it should be 
limited in the remedies it affords. In particular, attribution rights compatible with 
both high- and low-protectionist tendencies should not allow an author to suppress 
another’s speech for failure to attribute sources. Instead, the cure should be a 
reasonable amount of required disclosure, and, when the original author does not 
                                                                                                                            
own costs. American copyright and trademark laws allow fee awards in certain 
circumstances, but they are far from routine. 
46
 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1996). 
47
 Specifically, Choe sued because of the following problems: “‘treaty’ was changed 
improperly to ‘FCN Treaty’ in 12 places; ‘treaty’ should have been ‘Treaty’ in two 
instances; ‘parent’s’ should have been deleted in three references to the FCN Treaty; five 
footnote cross-references were misnumbered; two sentences needed rewriting; and 
numerous typographical errors marred the text.” Id. at 46. 
48
 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 306 (actual and statutory damages should be 
available, even in the absence of a timely registration). 
49
 See Kwall, supra note 3, at 2006. 
50
 For purposes of comparison, consider that takedown notices under § 512 of the 
Copyright Act, which are not threats to sue but simply notifications of claimed 
infringement, often result in the cessation of the challenged conduct, even when there are 
legitimate issues of noninfringement or fair use. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, 
Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 
(2006). 
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agree with the use to which her work has been put, a disclaimer indicating her 
distaste for the use.51 Digital culture arguably makes this much easier. As Jane 
Ginsburg explains,  
 
a requirement to identify all authors and performers may unreasonably 
encumber the radio broadcast of a song, but distributed recordings of the 
song might more conveniently include the listing. This may be 
particularly true of digital media, where a mouse click can provide 
information even more extensive than that available on a printed page.52 
 
The obvious solution of requiring lots of fine-print credits certainly invites 
litigation over when such credits are necessary, but it is extremely unlikely to 
protect either authors or consumers. This is because, English students and law 
professors aside, people rarely read footnotes, read through the credits of a film, or 
pay attention to disclosures in general.53 In other words, most people will not click 
on a link to read about all the authors and performers of a song. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) disapproves of internet “click to read” disclosures and 
disclaimers. In its judgment consumers are unlikely to make the required effort, 
especially when the “click to read” link does not indicate that it contains 
information that consumers will find significant.54 Attribution proponents want 
audiences to care as much about authorship as the proponents already do. But legal 
rights provide audiences with no reason to pay attention. Without norm 
entrepreneurship, the only way to get audiences to pay the “proper” amount of 
                                                 
51
 See, e.g., Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22; Kwall, supra note 3, at 
1990–91, 2005–07. 
52
 Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 304. 
53
 The research to date focuses on disclosures in consumer product advertising and 
labeling, but the findings support the idea that audiences are unlikely to process “fine print” 
wherever it is encountered, including at the end of films, unless they have special reasons 
to do so. See, e.g., Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Behavior Research and Social Policy, in 
HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 459 (Thomas S. Robertson & Harold H. Kassarjian 
eds., 1991) (consumers don’t often use disclaimers in making decisions); Gita 
Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The Use of Concurrent Disclosures to 
Correct Invalid Inferences, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 307, 320 (2000) (noting that because of 
cognitive processing limitations, “obviously effective disclosures (e.g., those that are 
encoded, those that are explicit, etc.) are often ineffective”). Laura Heymann acknowledges 
that her disclaimer-based attribution right is subject to these criticisms, but contends that 
disclaimers are better than the alternative of total suppression of unattributed or unwelcome 
uses. See Heymann, Trademark/Copyright, supra note 22, at 98 n.205. Her response does 
not, however, establish that disclaimers are better than the alternative of no attribution right 
at all. 
54
 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT 
ONLINE ADVERTISING 9–12, 17 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/ 
buspubs/dotcom/index.pdf.  
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attention is to jump up and down, blocking their view of something they want to 
see—and that has obvious costs to the audiences.55 
Similar issues have arisen with respect to product placement in entertainment. 
Commercial Alert, a consumer group, petitioned the FCC and the FTC to require 
pop-up disclaimers during the actual product placement.56 The petition made the 
point that disclosure at the beginning or end of the work was likely to be 
ineffective.57 The FTC rejected the argument that additional further disclosures 
were required,58 no doubt in large part because of the intrusiveness of an effective 
disclaimer.59 Pop-ups are amusing in music videos, but they are hardly conducive 
to maintaining the suspension of disbelief required in a James Bond movie.60 
Effectiveness and artistry are in competition, and the same would be true of 
attribution disclosures and disclaimers, especially when the artist’s interest is in 
identifying her contribution to a greater whole or her disagreement with a 
                                                 
55
 Jessica Silbey suggested to me that audiences may not care about credit as much as 
they are interested in contextualizing a work, which may involve information about 
individual creators or about a creative community. For example, Annalee Newitz has 
written about how American audiences react to Japanese anime, perceiving it as reflecting 
an entire cultural context, which often overwhelms or at least complements the significance 
of individual authors. See Annalee Newitz, Anime Otaku: Japanese Animation Fans 
Outside Japan, BAD SUBJECTS, Apr. 2004, available at http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1994/ 
13/newitz.html. 
56
 Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark, 
Sec’y, FTC, at 2 (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.commercialalert.org/ftc.pdf. 
57
 See id. at 3 (“The impact of the product placement, like that of ordinary ads, occurs 
at the moment of exposure. For this reason disclosure must occur at that same moment, as 
it does in print ads. To inform viewers of product placements only at the start or end of a 
show or segment is not adequate, because they might not be viewing then. Honesty and fair 
dealing require that the label be attached directly to the thing to which it pertains—in this 
case, the product placement.”). 
58
 See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary 
Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.commercialalert. 
org/FTCletter2.10.05.pdf. 
59
 See Commercial Alert, News Release, Advertisers Attack Honest Disclosure of 
Stealth Ads on TV, http://www.commercialalert.org/issues/culture/product-placement/ 
advertisers-attack-honest-disclosure-of-stealth-ads-on-tv (Nov. 15, 2003) (discussing the 
Freedom to Advertise Coalition’s argument that Commercial Alert’s proposed requirement 
of on-screen disclaimers during product placements would be “‘impractical,’ ‘dangerous,’ 
‘extreme,’ ‘radical,’ and that it ‘borders on the ludicrous,’ and that it would make 
programming ‘virtually unwatchable’”). 
60
 See Cindy Tsai, Starring Brand X: When the Product Becomes More Important 
Than the Plot, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 289, 305 (2007) (“The true benefit of product 
placement[] for the consumer is that it enhances the entertainment experience. It allows 
consumers to suspend their disbelief and be involved in the film. On-screen notices during 
the actual placement will ruin the entertainment experience for the consumer. Just like 
internet pop-up ads, on-screen notices during the actual placement will be distracting and 
annoying for the viewer. With pop-up notices, consumers will not be able to watch a film 
without constant distractions.”). 
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particular alteration. (Recall that many attribution proposals are designed to allow 
an original author to register disagreement with a permitted subsequent use.) 
Just as the FTC has to date accepted small end-credit disclosures with product 
placement, courts would probably accept footnote, click-to-read, or end-credit 
solutions. Fact finders are likely to treat such disclosures as “reasonable” forms of 
attribution in order to preserve the integrity of legitimate works like T.S. Eliot’s 
The Waste Land and Quentin Tarantino’s Jackie Brown. But they would be doing 
so only to support a legal fiction, not a requirement that audiences actually 
understand who should, in the law’s judgment, get credit for works.61 
Copyright low-protectionists, who do not highly value authorship, might not 
care about an ineffective attribution right as long as it reduces control and 
compensation claims from copyright owners. Still, the ineffectiveness of 
disclosures should matter both to those who see attribution in consumer protection 
terms and to authorial high-protectionists. The difficulties failed attributions pose 
to consumer-oriented theorists are obvious. For high-protectionists, an attribution 
that goes unnoticed fails to protect the unique relation between author and work 
because the third party in that relationship is, necessarily, the audience.  
Even if we treat the audience as passive and dependent on authors to make 
meaning, it cannot be ignored in the moral-rights analysis. From an author-
centered perspective, attribution is an important component of the artist’s message. 
If the audience misattributes a work, distortion of the message has occurred 
regardless of whether formal attribution requirements have been satisfied. To 
sharpen the point, imagine that a user properly attributed a work, and the author 
knew that the attribution was present on the work, but the attribution was printed in 
binary code, or invisible ink. Hardly anyone would say that attribution had really 
been made, because readers would not know about it. Once we recognize that 
readers’ understanding is a crucial component of attribution, however, we have to 
consider whether even explicit attributions in fact become part of their 
understanding of the work. 
Moral-rights proponents rarely discuss the complexities of communication, 
the irreducible gap between sender and receiver. This may be related to their 
general expectation that each work contains a proper, intended message or set of 
messages and their related belief that unintended interpretations are misreadings to 
be minimized. Because there is a true meaning, it must follow that unintended 
                                                 
61
 Other countries’ attribution rights require “reasonable” attribution. See Ginsburg, 
supra note 12, at 288–89, 292–93, 294–95 (discussing attribution rights in Commonwealth 
countries). The Commonwealth countries generally use the clarity and prominence of the 
attribution as a proxy for effectiveness. However, in the United Kingdom an author is 
entitled to an attribution that is “likely to bring [the author’s] identity to the attention of a 
person seeing or hearing the performance, exhibition, showing, broadcast or cable 
programme in question.” Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 77(7)(c) 
(U.K.) (emphasis added), quoted in Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 289. As far as I am aware, 
the meaning of this provision has not been extensively explored, possibly in part because of 
the significant restrictions the United Kingdom imposes on the assertion of an attribution 
right. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 290–92. 
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interpretations can be minimized. Given that I see meaning as emerging from the 
interactions between author, text, and audience, I don’t accept the initial 
premises—but even those who do should recognize that there is no syllogism here. 
Even if there is a true meaning and misreadings ought to be seen as harms, that 
does not mean they can in practice be stopped or even substantially decreased—
especially with the tools available to lawyers, as opposed to literature teachers.62 
The assumption behind high-protectionists’ endorsement of a disclosure 
remedy is that the audience will in fact perceive an overt attribution, but that is not 
necessarily true. Audiences, unfortunately, are very bad at interpreting 
information, even in situations when speakers have every incentive to 
communicate clearly and effectively.63 If courts took a reality-based approach, an 
attribution right would be much closer to an integrity right than many of its 
supporters want. As the Second Circuit pointed out in the important Gilliam v. 
ABC case involving unauthorized editing of Monty Python episodes for American 
television: 
 
We are doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible impression that 
is made by a television broadcast, especially since the viewer has no 
means of comparing the truncated version with the complete work in 
order to determine for himself the talents of plaintiffs. Furthermore, a 
disclaimer . . . would go unnoticed by viewers who tuned into the 
broadcast a few minutes after it began.64  
 
Thus, allowing a mutilated version of an original, even a fair use, inherently risks a 
misallocation of credit and blame between the original artist and a subsequent 
creator.  
                                                 
62
 I do believe in misreadings, at the extreme. It would be a misreading of the 
Constitution to see it “as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas.” Don Herzog, As 
Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 629 (1987). But, as 
the very outrageousness of that example suggests, implausible misreadings rarely cause 
trouble. Plausible ones, though, often tell us something important even if they are, in the 
end, wrong. 
63
 See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text; see also JACOB JACOBY & WAYNE 
D. HOYER, THE COMPREHENSION AND MISCOMPREHENSION OF PRINT COMMUNICATIONS 
110–13 (1987) (finding that an average of 19% of messages in magazine advertisements 
were affirmatively misunderstood by consumers, while 16% of the messages were not 
received; no message was correctly conveyed to all readers, and all but 3 of 1,347 
respondents misunderstood something about the four advertisements they read); JACOB 
JACOBY ET AL., MISCOMPREHENSION OF TELEVISED COMMUNICATIONS 64–73 (1980) 
(finding that consumers misunderstood an average of 28.3% of messages in television 
commercial ads; 81.3% of consumers misunderstood at least some portion); Jacob Jacoby 
& George J. Szybillo, Why Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 224, 226 (1994) (listing 
reasons why consumers may not receive messages that are directed to them, such as 
inattention and information overload). 
64
 538 F.2d 14, 25 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976).  
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In the Gilliam situation, perhaps a constant disclaimer on the screen stating 
“edited by ABC; not approved by Monty Python” would inform most consumers, 
at the cost of destroying a substantial amount of the show’s visual appeal.65 
However, even if a court were willing to require such drastic measures, how would 
that solution work with music? What should 2 Live Crew do to indicate that certain 
portions of their song “Pretty Woman” were taken from Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman,” while others were not?66 
Again, an attribution right could limit this problem by only requiring 
attribution where feasible. My argument, however, is that effective attribution is 
rarely feasible. Given audiences’ often low levels of attention, the vast number of 
works to which we are exposed in the modern environment, and basic cognitive 
limitations on processing information, even a clearly stated attribution has only a 
limited chance of informing audiences, and we can expect routine failures. In this, 
attribution is not much different from other types of information. Often, regulators 
face a practical choice between (1) allowing a simple statement that will inevitably 
be misunderstood by some significant percentage of the target audience or (2) 
suppressing the statement entirely. The middle ground of requiring more nuanced 
disclosures is comforting, but simply does not work.67 
Ineffective attribution may often be possible, but the social costs of a legally 
enforceable right to ineffective attribution seem unjustified. Moreover, a feasibility 
analysis makes starkly clear how discriminatory an attribution right is across types 
of artistry, as the next section explores.  
 
C.  Attribution and Multiple-Author Works 
 
Depending on the way in which audiences receive and perceive works, 
attribution may be relatively simple or prohibitively difficult. The implicit model 
of the author entitled to an attribution right is a single artist whose name deserves 
                                                 
65
 This result might satisfy authorial high-protectionists, who would not want ABC to 
broadcast the mutilated version in any event, and some consumer advocates. Yet, 
consumers have competing interests, including interests in being entertained. To the extent 
that disclosures and disclaimers impair the audience’s experience, consumer protection 
goals may not be furthered, especially if the material affected involves commentary, 
parody, or other socially beneficial uses. Preventing deception is not the only way to 
protect consumers, and may even harm them on balance, if it suppresses competition. See 
Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights 
Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. (POCKET PART) 352, 357 (2007), http://yalelaw 
journal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html (arguing that trademark law should rely upon 
established concepts of free competition and free speech, not “evanescent and irrelevant” 
consumer confusion). 
66
 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (finding that 2 Live 
Crew may have made fair use of Orbison’s song). 
67
 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and 
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2007). 
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to be the only name attached to a single book, sculpture, painting, or similar visual 
work. In many cases, this model already depends on the erasure of key figures—
editors, research assistants, agents, dealers, and others who shaped the works. But 
since an attribution right would only cement, not cause, their separation from 
credit, I will not discuss them further. When we move away from that core 
model—whether by adding authors whose contribution levels may vary or 
changing the medium from the purely visual—the proper scope of an attribution 
right becomes unclear at best.68 
 
1.  Joint Authors 
 
Group authorship creates serious attribution problems, especially when none 
of the people involved in a creation own the copyright because it is owned by 
corporate entity instead. Catherine Fisk, writing about multi-participant projects in 
business contexts, makes observations that apply to many creative endeavors, from 
software to movies: 
 
Participants in some group projects often do not know exactly what their 
contributions are. Ex ante, they do not know what the project will entail, 
how long it will take, who will contribute how much in terms of time, 
useful ideas or skills along the way, or even whether the project will 
succeed enough to make it worth thinking about who did what. Ex post, 
people have a hard time reconstructing what their contribution was, and 
psychological literature shows a tendency of people to exaggerate (in 
their own mind) their successful interventions and to forget their failures. 
Some of the literature even suggests that it is entirely rational for 
participants to exhibit this form of over-confidence in their abilities and 
skill.69 
 
Disputes over joint authorship illustrate this problem when people who admittedly 
contributed substantial value to a work claim—usually unsuccessfully—that their 
contributions rise to the level of “authorship” for copyright purposes. 
Courts are generally unwilling to recognize multiple authors even when it is 
uncontested that multiple people are responsible for a work’s final form.70 
Currently, “authorship” also carries with it initial ownership of the copyright. 
Thus, litigation that adds a new joint author to a work, such as a film, substantially 
                                                 
68
 See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1232–33 (recognizing this issue and arguing 
that consumer-protection attribution rights should only apply to works like novels, which 
have at most a few authors deserving attribution). 
69
 Fisk, supra note 22, at 105. See generally CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS 
ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001) 
(discussing variations in credit norms and behaviors across academic disciplines, and 
persistent tendencies of everyone involved to feel slighted). 
70
 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231–35 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson 
v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 204–05 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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disrupts the economic expectations of the film’s producers, and creates potential 
licensing problems, since all authors must agree in order to grant exclusive 
licenses. This is likely an important reason that courts have adopted restrictive 
definitions of joint authorship, essentially requiring that the “main” author have 
consciously intended to share the specific legal status of authorship. Many scholars 
have persuasively criticized the current case law,71 but as long as it exists, 
attribution rights will be insufficient for many people who, in lay terms, deserve 
credit for creative works. If we are interested in properly allocating credit among 
creative participants, we will have to reconstruct the definition of joint 
authorship.72  
If we did create a special type of “attribution authorship” that carried with it 
no economic rights, legal recognition of multiple contributions might improve. 
This change would increase the number of line-drawing problems substantially, of 
course, but authorial high-protectionists might judge it worth the costs, if only to 
push copyright law to recognize the importance of multiply-authored works.73 
Consumer advocates, likewise, might endorse attribution rights for natural persons, 
because consumers may be far more interested in the identity of a film’s director 
and cinematographer than in the identity of the studio that owns the copyright. 
Copyright low-protectionists, by contrast, are unlikely to see much gain from such 
a rule, because it would add rights without any tradeoff in increased access or 
freedom of re-use. Attribution would not substitute for compensation and control 
rights in such cases, because those rights would remain in other hands. 
 
2.  Derivative Works  
 
Multiple authorship exists not just in isolated works, but in the even trickier 
category of derivative works. The Supreme Court invoked this problem in Dastar 
as one reason for limiting the application of the Lanham Act: 
 
                                                 
71
 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for 
Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 57–58 
(2001) (arguing that joint authorship need not imply equal rights, any more than tenancy in 
common does). 
72
 Kwall clearly recognizes this interrelationship between authorship definitions and 
attribution rights. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: 
Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 990, 
1001–02 (2002). 
73
 Fisk points out a related problem: new legal attribution rights could increase 
perceived unfairness among those who don’t qualify for the newly expanded categories. 
See Fisk, supra note 22, at 112 (“Any effort to identify contributors will create a 
subterranean group whose work goes unrecognized, and those who feel themselves to be 
closest to the line entitling them to recognition may feel wronged in a way that they would 
not feel if they were farther from the line and there were a larger group of anonymous 
contributors. The problem is inescapable in collaborative work because the law asks us to 
see distinct categories in a world in which people might otherwise see gradations.”). 
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Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word “origin” has no 
discernable limits. A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its 
copyright has expired, would presumably require attribution not just to 
MGM, but to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which 
the film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the 
musical was based), and to Prosper Mérimée (who wrote the novel on 
which the opera was based). In many cases, figuring out who is in the 
line of “origin” would be no simple task.74 
 
It is possible that audiences might not care about the antecedents of a derivative 
work, but they might. Even without consumer confusion, authors are likely to want 
to control the use or omission of their names on derivative works, especially when 
those works reach new audiences.75 
However, initial authors and derivative work audiences are unlikely to agree 
on what descriptions are truthful and significant. Movies made from comic books 
provide an easy example where credit will necessarily depend on audience 
assumptions about the relative contributions of the actors, directors, screenwriters, 
comic writers, and so on. The audiences for such movies are larger by orders of 
magnitude than the audiences for the original works. Precise division of credit 
would require each moviegoer to sit down and compare the comic (or the novel, or 
play, etc.) to the adaptation. This is not going to happen, because moviegoers want 
to see a movie, not to read a comic book. They could be informed that the work 
was changed from the original—but do they need an attribution right to figure that 
out? And all this merely addresses the relationship between the original author and 
the audience—the creators whose expression went into the derivative work will 
have strong opinions of their own about credit and blame, which will likely 
conflict with the original author’s. 
One senses that the practice of licensing someone else to develop a derivative 
work is itself something that high-protectionist moral-rights proponents find odd 
and a little distasteful. The widespread practice of surrendering artistic control to 
another’s judgments—even if the original author exercises supervisory powers, 
which she often does not—is in tension with the basic moral-rights claim that 
authors have unique and inviolable connections to their own works. It is therefore 
no surprise that attribution problems are particularly tricky in such situations. 
A related problem raised by derivative works is the problem of blame, which 
is the flip side of attribution.76 If an attribution right is applied beyond the 
copyright owner’s right to control use, the practice of giving credit might lead 
audiences to assume that the copyright owner endorsed the work at issue. In the 
orphan-works context, one commentator discussed the example of a song whose 
                                                 
74
 Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003). 
75
 See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992) (concerning credit for a 
movie based, at least in theory, on a short story by Stephen King). 
76
 Fisk refers to this as the “discipline function” of attribution. See Fisk, supra note 
22, at 61–62. 
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creator is known but unfindable. Under an orphan-works regime, the producers of 
a pornographic film could use the song as long as they gave proper credit—but the 
songwriter might not appreciate that credit very much.77 Attribution would disclose 
one truth, the source of a work, while potentially distorting another—the author's 
relationship to the use at issue.78 
Neither authorial high-protectionists nor consumer advocates would see an 
unqualified good in such cases of undesired attribution. Again, low-protectionists 
might accept these consequences in order to get more freedom to use orphan 
works; but that is merely to say that attribution is doing other work for them than 
vindicating authors’ interests in controlling credit. 
Most economically significant copyrighted works—the kinds most likely to 
generate litigation—are the products of multiple creators’ efforts, whether jointly 
(movies), sequentially (derivative works), or both (Batman Begins). The more 
cooks adding ingredients to the recipe, the more difficult it is to identify 
responsibility for the final result, and the more room there is for disagreement, 
reasonable and otherwise. Attribution for screenwriters of Hollywood films, for 
example, is subject to elaborate standards developed by industry experts over 
decades, yet it still routinely produces disputes requiring arbitration.79 
Screenwriting credits can be significantly removed from responsibility for what 
actually gets filmed, and industry participants know this. However, credit is still a 
matter of pride, and screenwriting credit also determines entitlement to residual 
royalties.80 Given the high stakes in money and ego, the industry has significant 
                                                 
77
 See 43(B)log, Orphan Works, Panel 2, part 2, http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2006/03/ 
orphan-works-panel-2-part-2.html (Mar. 7, 2006, 14:30 EST) (reporting comments of Jay 
Rosenthal of the Recording Artists Coalition at Orphan Works: New Prospects for a 
Solution, American University, Washington College of Law, Feb. 24, 2006); see also 
43(B)log, Orphan Works Find Home at AU, http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2006/03/orphan-
works-find-home-at-au.html (Mar. 6, 2006, 22:29 EST) (reporting comments of Mitch 
Glazer of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) at the same conference; 
Glazer pointed out that a user of an orphan work might be only fifty percent sure about 
who the creator was; an unalloyed attribution requirement therefore risks false credit and 
false blame). 
78
 See discussion infra Part III.B for one possible response to the problem of 
undeserved blame. 
79
 For a description of the system, see Fisk, supra note 22, at 77–80. Fisk notes that in 
2002, “67 of 210 feature film writing credits were arbitrated.” Id. at 79. 
80
 See Kung Fu Monkey, Writing: Arbitration Letters, http://kfmonkey.blogspot.com/ 
2007/03/writing-arbitration-letters.html (Mar. 15, 2007 10:14 MST) (“The main reason 
people want credit on a movie is not for bragging rights or employment; everybody in 
Hollywood knows what kind of writer you are based on your scripts circulating through the 
studio system. . . . To be blunt, after reading the shooting script of CATWOMAN, I was 
pretty dubious about having my name on it . . . . But then . . . I thought about the two odd 
years of shitty, shitty development, weekly meetings with ungodly notes until finally they 
asked me to leave because I’d gotten too truculent with my insistence that if we made the 
movie the way they wanted, it would suck . . . and I considered any possible residuals the 
bonus pay for that experience.”). 
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incentives to develop a workable credit scheme, but its rules still consistently 
engender disputes and resentment.81 As one screenwriter points out, the routine use 
of arbitration encourages screenwriters to vent, and perhaps fixate on “the various 
frustrations they’ve felt at the film development process,”82 which are many. While 
he finds the results of arbitration generally reasonable, he observes that “every now 
and then some infamously bizarre decision will come down the pipe that’s so 
disturbingly arbitrary, it reinforces the sense of panic and helplessness most writers 
feel . . . well, every day-ish.”83 It is unlikely that copyright law could succeed 
where industry experts have repeatedly just muddled through. 
Given the difficulty that a highly concentrated industry has with managing 
attribution, developing new legally enforceable attribution norms in less-well-
organized mediums would be a daunting prospect. Right now, these disputes are 
left to the private realm, resolved (often unsatisfactorily) by moral suasion or 
contract. Law could not do better. 
 
D.  Author's Rights and the Problem of Pseudonymity 
 
Many of the problems discussed so far can be, if not avoided, rendered less 
weighty. If one only considers the author’s own interests in attribution, the fact that 
a literally correct attribution might not succeed in getting audiences to assign 
proper credit is not the death knell for an attribution right.  
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall defends the attribution right as a way to defend the 
integrity of an author's work, though not as a traditional “integrity right.”84 She 
argues that misattribution distorts the meaning and message of an author’s work. 
Because preserving the author’s message to his audience is part of her concern, it 
may be the case that an explicit but ineffective disclaimer would not vindicate the 
author’s right as she defines it.85 Yet even if we treated the author’s right as an 
                                                 
81
 See id. (“Now the insane ugly truth here is that trying to turn the difference between 
”Story by” and ”Screenplay by” and ”Written by” into solid, actionable guidelines for the 
arbitrating readers is, well . . . insane. Despite the best efforts of the Guild folk . . . the 
guidelines somehow manage to be both authoritative and vague. . . . Each screenwriter . . . 
gets to write a letter . . . in which we argue out how we interpret these objectively/ 
subjective guidelines applying to the scripts in question, supporting the credits we think are 
fair. . . . The real thriller is that you have no idea what other writers are claiming. Some 
guys come on hard on arbitration because they got fucked on their last project, and now it’s 
time for the hate to run downhill.”) (first ellipsis in original). 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 See Kwall, supra note 20, at 743; Kwall, supra note 3, at 1972–73. 
85
 See Kwall, supra note 3, at 2008–09 (“The proposed standard . . . is designed to 
facilitate public knowledge of the original author’s message regarding works possessing 
these qualities . . . . [A]s an authorship norm dignity demands an external embodiment 
allowing the inner personality to commodify and explain itself to the outside world. This 
conception of dignity requires a public linkage between the author’s inner labor and its 
external embodiment.”) (footnotes omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 62–67 
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entirely formal one, designed to give him the satisfaction of knowing his message 
was out there, the author-centered view must be balanced against audience 
interests. On its own, it fails to justify an attribution right. 
The limitations of the author-centered view can be seen in its unqualified 
endorsement of rights to publish anonymously or to use a pseudonym, including a 
pseudonym that adopts a particular identity. In some situations, identifying a work 
with a particular person has profound effects.86 A Holocaust survivor, for example, 
may wish to create works using that epithet rather than a personal name in order to 
universalize her experience; identifying the work with a particular human being 
could change the artist’s relationship to the work as well as the audience’s 
reaction.87 Or a pamphleteer could use a pseudonym suggesting group authorship 
in order to give her political opinions the credibility attached to an organized 
group; forcing her to use her own name would blunt message.88 Kwall does not 
explicitly address unauthorized derivative works or uses of excerpts such as those 
made by Lethem in this context, but Lessig’s experience suggests that an 
unattributed quotation can interfere at least with the author’s relationship to his 
work—his pride in creating a uniquely felicitous expression.89 
The problem with attribution rights as integrity rights is the problem with 
traditional integrity rights. That is, there are good reasons to deny authors control 
over interpretations of their works, including interpretations driven by authorial 
identity. More specifically, the Holocaust survivor, the woman who has had an 
abortion, and the soldier who has served in Iraq, among others, may 
understandably want their experiences to be taken to represent the standard, 
normal, or consensus experience of people in their positions. I have no quarrel with 
the idea that the First Amendment generally bars government from requiring them 
to disclose their identities. But if someone else knows and identifies the author of 
an anonymous or pseudonymous work, that information can also clarify matters for 
the audience, even if it distorts the author’s intended message.90  
                                                                                                                            
(arguing that author-focused justifications for attribution rights nonetheless must consider 
audience perceptions). 
86
 For discussion of the ways in which anonymity can change both speakers’ 
expression—their willingness to say particular things—and audiences’ reactions, see 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous 
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1550, 1568–69 (2007). 
87
 See Kwall, supra note 20, at 744 (discussing Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, 
supra note 22, at 1406). 
88
 See Kwall, supra note 20, at 746–47 (discussing Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, 
supra note 22, at 1430, and the facts of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 
334 (1995)).  
89
 Jessica Silbey suggested to me that Lessig’s protest was tongue in cheek. Lethem 
and I took him seriously; if we were wrong, though, that just adds another strike against the 
concept of transparent authorial meaning. 
90
 Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 128 & n.23, 197 (2003) (decrying misleading 
use of names in campaign-related advertising); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and 
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 85 (1991) (arguing that a speaker’s true identity is important information 
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Joe Klein published Primary Colors, the Bill Clinton campaign roman à clef, 
as a novel by “Anonymous,” but his position in the campaign was quite relevant to 
many readers’ understanding of the novel.  
Likewise, the anonymous pamphleteer wants to seem to represent a mass 
movement by calling the pamphlet the work of “concerned citizens.” Yet, if she 
actually represents a movement of one, that is important information for her 
audience to know, especially insofar as she is relying on apparent popularity as 
rhetorical technique.91 Indeed, in commercial contexts, this type of 
misrepresentation is actionable false advertising.92 “The public is entitled to get 
what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or 
perhaps by ignorance.”93 
                                                                                                                            
for audiences evaluating the persuasiveness of that speaker’s claims); Lidsky & Cotter, 
supra note 86, at 1545, 1559–61 (claiming authorial identity can be a vital component of a 
message, and anonymity can deprive audiences of key information), 1576 (discussing 
authors who favorably review their own work anonymously or pseudonymously, 
attempting to deceive readers). 
91
 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 86, at 1544 (suggesting that the Supreme Court in 
McIntyre “gloss[ed] over the implication that others supported the arguments made in the 
handbill” (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337)). 
92
 See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(finding that an ad misrepresenting consumer preference survey results was false 
advertising). Heymann acknowledges that accurate biographical information can be 
important, but points out that her argument for recognizing rights in invented “authornyms” 
does not prevent anyone from investigating and publicizing truthful information. See 
Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22, at 1426. (By contrast, Kwall’s author-
centered view of attribution sees unmasking a pseudonym as a moral wrong.) I am 
unconvinced that Heymann sufficiently addresses the problem of deceptive authornyms. 
While more speech is sometimes the only available corrective for false speech, in 
trademark and false advertising law, to which she analogizes authornyms, producers have 
no right to make false claims about provenance just because someone else could advertise 
the truth. Indeed, the point of trademark and false advertising law is to provide a legal 
remedy to stop false claims and obviate the need for counterspeech. 
93
 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387 (1965) (citation omitted). 
Colgate-Palmolive upheld the FTC’s finding that it was deceptive to show a simulated 
product test in a television advertisement as if it were a recording of a real test, even though 
real tests produced the same results, but did not look good on television. Id. at 377. The 
Court analogized to trademark law, which bars passing off even when the defendant’s 
goods are of equal quality: 
 
[T]he seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an 
annoying or irrational habit of the buying public—the preference for particular 
manufacturers or known brands regardless of a product’s actual qualities, the 
prejudice against reprocessed goods, and the desire for verification of a product 
claim. In each case the seller reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will 
be satisfied with the performance of the product he receives. Yet, a 
misrepresentation has been used to break the habit and . . . a misrepresentation 
for such an end is not permitted. 
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The problem of misrepresentation via pseudonym has arisen most often with 
authors who write as if they belonged to historically disadvantaged minority 
groups, but in fact were members of the majority. In such cases, the construction of 
an authorial identity is linked very closely to the message of the works, but that is 
precisely what audiences (and minority authors forced to compete with faux-
minority authors) find objectionable when the deception is exposed.94 And 
deception is the right word, even if the author feels justified in adopting a different 
identity in order to get her work taken seriously. It may not much matter whether 
John Grisham is really a lawyer.95 But it matters a fair amount whether “Justin 
Anthony Wyrick Jr.,” a top-rated provider of legal advice on the advice website 
AskMe.com, was “a law expert with two years of formal training in the law” who 
had been “involved in trials, legal studies and certain forms of jurisprudence” (as 
he claimed) or whether he was a fifteen-year-old relying on Law and Order 
episodes for his expertise (as he in fact was).96  
“Wyrick” was never a moral-rights claimant, and his advice, while 
copyrighted because it was delivered in written form, probably would not qualify 
for protection in a moral-rights regime that required a heightened originality 
standard. I use him as an example to show that the source’s identity routinely 
matters, and that the ways in which it matters will be difficult to define in advance 
because of the myriad modes of and reasons for human communication.97 
To take a more literary example, James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces became 
a bestseller largely on the strength of its claims to autobiographical detail. When it 
                                                                                                                            
Id. at 389. Similarly, authors may attempt to attract readers by adopting a persona with 
specific identifying features; if the readers enjoy the story, the impulse is to say that no 
harm has been done. But the authors of the works the readers would have purchased 
instead, had they known the truth, would probably disagree. And sometimes, the readers 
may feel harmed if they attributed special value to works by an author who pretended to 
come from a particular group. 
94
 See Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22, at 1400–01 (noting that 
audiences often react with anger and accusations of betrayal when the author’s ethnic 
identity is revealed). For general discussion of creating in another’s voice, see BORROWED 
POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 71–136 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 
1997); RANDALL, supra note 40, at 56; SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: 
APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 90–102 (2005). 
95
 See Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22, at 1422–23 (“So long as the 
fan of Grisham’s novels can identify those novels branded with Grisham’s authornym and 
distinguish them from others, he need not know any details of Grisham’s ‘true’ identity—
indeed, ‘John Grisham’ can be female or a nonlawyer or a collective authorial endeavor.”). 
96
 See Michael Lewis, Faking It, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
97
 Modern audiences may dislike pseudonyms precisely because the cult of the author 
has had such success. See STEPHEN KING, THE BACHMAN BOOKS: FOUR EARLY NOVELS BY 
STEPHEN KING ix (1985) (“There is a stigma attached to the idea of the pen name. . . . As 
respect for the art of the novel rose, things changed. Both critics and general readers 
became suspicious of work done by men and women who elected to hide their identities. If 
it was good, the unspoken opinion seems to run, the guy would have put his real name on 
it.”). 
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turned out that his biography differed substantially from the life described in his 
book, public outrage followed, along with fraud lawsuits and, ultimately, a 
settlement from the publisher.98 If Frey had not been found out, however, he and 
his publisher would have continued to profit. As Lastowka puts it, 
“[m]isattribution of authorial identity is valuable to those who engage in it 
precisely because it deceives the public.”99  
Laura Albert’s novel Sarah also involved a misrepresentation of identity that 
resulted in a lawsuit. Sarah is about a 12-year-old male prostitute in competition 
with his mother for tricks, which Albert wrote under the penname J.T. LeRoy.100 
Sarah was promoted as a novel with substantial autobiographical elements, but it 
was not.101 Because of the apparent realism, LeRoy received a movie deal, but the 
filmmaker’s financing collapsed when Albert was exposed as an older, female 
author instead of the young man she had constructed.102 The film company sued. 
Its federal false advertising and passing off claims were dismissed based on 
Dastar, but its state-law fraud claim survived,103 and a jury found in its favor.104 
This incident illustrates the substantial harm that can be done by 
misrepresentations of identity, mainly because some audiences members resent 
                                                 
98
 See Samantha J. Katze, A Million Little Maybes: The James Frey Scandal and 
Statements on a Book Cover or Jacket as Commercial Speech, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 207, 208, 210–11 (2006); Alex Beam, A Million Little Lawsuits, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2007, at 6D; cf. Jessica Silbey, Criminal Performances: Film, 
Autobiography, and Confession, 37 N. MEX. L. REV. 189, 189–93 (2007) (situating the 
Frey controversy in debates over authenticity and the reconstruction of past events). 
99
 Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1227; cf. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and 
Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 131 (2006) (arguing for mandatory disclosure of 
commercial intent when advertisers sponsor speech, whether as product placement in 
media or “astroturf” word-of-mouth endeavors, in order to properly inform audiences who 
are deceived into thinking that such speech results from the speakers’ independent 
judgment). 
100
 See generally J.T. LEROY, SARAH (2000) (presenting herself as J.T. LeRoy, Laura 
Albert created an author with a history of prostitution, drug addiction, and vagrancy). 
101
 See Alan Feuer, Going to Court over Fiction by a Fictitious Writer, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2007, at B1 (“Mr. LeRoy seemed at first to be a hot commodity in today’s 
biography-obsessed literary world, a gifted writer with a grotesquely compelling story that 
only enhanced the value of the work.”). 
102
 See id. (stating that the director wanted to “blend elements of J.T. LeRoy’s 
biography into the narrative of ‘Sarah’ in . . . a film about ‘how art could emerge from a 
ruined childhood,’” but “[t]he trouble was there was no ruined childhood from which art 
could actually emerge,” and the commercial prospects of the film were threatened because 
“‘[t]he whole autobiographical back story aura that made this so attractive was a sham’” 
(quoting the director’s lawyer)). 
103
 See Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ'g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 
396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
104
 See Alan Feuer, Jury Finds ‘JT LeRoy’ Was Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at 
B1. 
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being asked to give greater credibility to a story based on the storyteller’s identity 
when the storyteller’s identity is itself a fiction.105 
Nonetheless, not all voluntary misattributions should be considered false 
advertising or trademark misuse. Lastowka considers instances of writing under a 
real author’s “brand name” to be deeply troubling, as when Tom Clancy licensed 
his name for a line of adventure novels or when V.C. Andrews’ estate authorized 
further “V.C. Andrews” novels featuring Andrews’ well-known (one might say 
“trademark”) trope of “troubled young girls surviving perverse torments inflicted 
by demented adults.”106 He recounts instances in which readers expressed dismay 
at learning that the named author did not write the books, and others in which 
readers were apparently confused as to authorship.107 He asserts that there is little 
reason to think that ghostwriting of this sort produces any public benefits.108  
Yet Lastowka’s analysis suffers from the general flaw of discussions of 
attribution: the failure to recognize that information that is confusing and even 
deceptive to some people is helpful to others. People who want to read stories 
about troubled young girls surviving perverse torments inflicted by demented 
adults, for example, can use the V.C. Andrews name/brand as a useful shortcut.109 
                                                 
105
 There are degrees of belief, of course. We do not believe that reality TV or 
Michael Moore’s films are completely unstaged. The question of when law should attempt 
to create a space in which we can believe certain claims, in the service of preserving 
mutual trust and respect, is an extremely complicated one. Without denying that audiences 
can be sophisticated in evaluating the constructedness of a narrative, I would argue that too 
great a divergence from the conventions of a form such as autobiography or documentary 
can deceive and harm audiences. Consider, for example, the difference if Michael Moore 
had hired actors to portray healthcare-seekers in his film Sicko and did not disclose that 
fact, as opposed to shooting hundreds of hours of footage and choosing only that which 
supported his case. I thank Jessica Silbey for pressing me on this point. 
106
 Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1225.  
107
 See id. at 1224 & nn.258–59.  
108
 See id. at 1227.  
109
 Lastowka suggests that the ghostwritten V.C. Andrews novels harm other authors 
writing under their own names, because readers’ money and attention are zero-sum. See id. 
at 1240. However, he does not take into account the efficiency of trademarks as brands. 
Other authors might be able to cut deals with the V.C. Andrews estate if they could show 
an ability to satisfy readers’ demands for stories about troubled young girls surviving 
perverse torments inflicted by demented adults. Even if they could not write for the V.C. 
Andrews brand, it is not clear why those other authors are entitled to get readers instead of 
the estate-authorized ghostwriter just because they are using their own, non-established 
names. They might be writing better books (by whatever standard one wants to apply), but 
readers still face costs in sorting through all the possibilities and finding ones that satisfy 
their preferences, and the V.C. Andrews estate has centralized and applied its publishing 
expertise to the problem, which may be the most efficient result. By contrast, when an 
author pretends to be a member of a minority or historically disadvantaged group, the 
history of domination, exploitation, and silencing may create a cognizable harm to authors 
who are truly from that group. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Special concerns 
arise when a nonmember speaks for, and in the place of, a minority group given that 
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It is an empirical matter whether the use of a name this way hurts more consumers 
than it helps.110 Given the massive sales of multiple ghostwritten V.C. Andrews 
novels over decades, one could easily argue that the brand is performing its 
intended function. Those readers who have never learned that Andrew Neiderman 
is the current ghostwriter behind the novels would be harmed if he was forced to 
publish only under his name because they would have difficulty finding the new 
source of the works they desire. Moreover, even the discomfort felt by some 
readers who discover that Andrew Neiderman is the author of recent V.C. Andrews 
books has a potential upside: it may demonstrate to them that the author is not 
always unique or irreplaceable, encouraging them to play with favorite characters 
and situations themselves.111 
Thus, I am not advocating a ban on ghostwriting or on adopting another 
identity, which can have valuable and liberating effects for the author.112 But 
considering only the author’s interest in controlling attribution discounts the 
audience’s powerful interests in deciding for itself whether the author has the 
authority to be speaking as she does. 
 
III.  LESSONS FOR LEGISLATION 
 
Adding a new, generalized attribution right to American copyright law would 
be a mistake at this time, despite the strong moral claims to attribution that authors 
have in many circumstances. The additional complexity and uncertainty that would 
be generated would outweigh the benefits to authors. But there are other ways to 
encourage attribution, for instance through norms and “best practices” such as 
those set out by documentary filmmakers. The filmmakers have attempted to 
define when it is fair use to incorporate others’ copyrighted works in their films 
without seeking expensive, and often unavailable consent, and have made 
attribution a cornerstone of their best practices.113 There are also smaller reforms 
                                                                                                                            
audiences are likely to confer special authority and credibility on authors who present 
themselves as minority-group members. 
110
 For example, in the Frey and Albert cases discussed above, some readers might 
have treated the authors’ supposed autobiographical information as irrelevant or merely 
entertaining, regardless of its truth value. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
The key issue is whether the harms to those who are deceived outweighs the benefits to 
those who are not. 
111
 See Weather Pattern, The Bourne Redundancy, http://www.weatherpattern.com/ 
2007/08/the-bourne-redundancy/ (Aug. 20, 2007, 8:26 PM) (“If [authorized books] are of 
equal or perhaps even better quality of the original author, readers start asking what makes 
the original author so special? If the new books are bad, readers start questioning why one 
author gets the privilege of penning new works and they may be more apt to enter the 
world of fan fiction. . . . The application and defense of an author’s rights extending 
beyond his death may actually encourage the weakening of those rights.”). 
112
 See Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 22, at 1398–99. 
113
 See ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ 
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 3–7 (2005), available at http://www.centerfor 
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that, like the addition of VARA and the DMCA’s provisions on CMI, could 
introduce attribution rights in dribs and drabs. This section considers two such 
proposals. 
 
A.  Attribution and Fair Use 
 
Greg Lastowka, like the filmmakers, considers attribution an important 
element in establishing fair use. He has proposed amending the Copyright Act to 
make attribution to the author an explicit fifth factor for courts to consider in 
assessing fair use defenses.114 He argues that this would correct the doctrine’s 
current focus on commercial exploitation and compensation, to the exclusion of 
other incentives for creation.115 Credit, he argues, is a powerful and increasing 
motive for creativity, and should be recognized as such in our fair use doctrine.116  
I have argued in the past that the presence of disclaimers should influence fair 
use determinations, at least in the context of fan fiction and other unauthorized 
creative works based on popular media texts.117 Although I still believe this, I 
disagree that attribution should be inserted into § 107 for consideration in every 
case. Whether the statutory factors determine results in litigated cases, or whether 
courts manipulate them to reach what they deem to be the overall proper result, is a 
matter of much debate.118 Assuming that a new factor would influence outcomes, 
however, Lastowka’s proposal raises some of the problems discussed above, albeit 
in the limited context of fair use.  
Will attribution be owed to individual “authors” in the lay sense, or to the 
entities that are authors for purposes of copyright because they are the proprietors 
of works for hire? If the former, this will be a significant inroad into the work-for-
hire principle, and one that may pose substantial difficulties for would-be fair users 
who are not in the ideal position to identify the individual author of a work for 
hire. If the latter, attribution to a corporate owner has less of a moral and practical 
pull; in Lastowka’s terms, corporate owners of works for hire are less likely to be 
                                                                                                                            
socialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair_use_final.pdf (recommending attribution as part of the best 
case for fair use in documentaries). 
114
 See Lastowka, supra note 5, at 48–53. Specifically, this fifth factor should be “the 
provision of attribution, in a manner reasonable under the circumstances, to the author of 
the work.” Id. at 49. 
115
 See id. at 49. 
116
 See id. at 48, 53–54. 
117
 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 680 (1997). 
118
 See, e.g., David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair 
Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (“Basically, had Congress legislated a 
dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it 
appears that the upshot would be the same.”); cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) 
(identifying particular factors and subfactors that appear to be important in driving 
outcomes, and others that are unimportant).  
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incentivized by credit than individual authors.119 Separately, an attribution rule 
keyed to current ownership would conflict with the norms of attribution, in that 
users sometimes identify an auteur figure such as a director or producer as the 
person to whom credit is due even when a corporation is the copyright owner and 
legal author. 
Even if we choose individual authors over owners for fair use purposes, lay 
practices do not generally allocate credit for multiply-authored works. The auteur 
idea is common and convenient even when other creators such as screenwriters are 
directly responsible for much of the final product. Thus, for example, fan fiction 
and other unauthorized fan-created works based on the television show Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer often praise creator Joss Whedon, but rarely if ever list all the 
writers and other creative contributors.120 Likewise, people citing song lyrics 
routinely identify the singer or group most strongly associated with the song, rather 
than the composer. Noncommercial, transformative uses, including quotations, 
would therefore often lack proper attribution from a strict legal standpoint, even 
though such uses should be and currently are specially favored in fair use 
analysis.121 
Assuming this problem can be solved, or accounted for in the overall fair use 
analysis, an explicit attribution requirement fails to take into account ways in 
which the relevant audience’s knowledge may itself substitute for attribution.122 If 
a work is famous enough, attribution may be distracting or even a bit insulting to 
the audience’s intelligence. Lastowka quotes the important Second Circuit case of 
Rogers v. Koons to show that fair use determinations already take attribution into 
account. He does not consider, however, the implications of the court’s references 
to the audience’s awareness:  
 
[The public must be aware of the original work] to insure that credit is 
given where credit is due. By requiring that the copied work be an object 
                                                 
119
 The argument for attribution rights with which Lastowka begins his article, Ralph 
R. Shaw’s Copyright and the Right to Credit, even distinguishes an author’s interest in 
credit, which might be maximized by distributing a work for free, from his publisher’s 
interest in compensation, which is necessary for the publisher to survive. See Ralph R. 
Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 752 (1951), quoted in 
Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1. 
120
 See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 154; Tushnet, supra note 117, at 669 n.84, 679 
n.135 (examples of attribution to auteur). 
121
 The argument for attribution rights with which Lastowka begins his article, Ralph 
R. Shaw’s Copyright and the Right to Credit, even distinguishes an author’s interest in 
credit, which might be maximized by distributing a work for free, from his publisher’s 
interest in compensation, which is necessary for the publisher to survive. See Ralph R. 
Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 752 (1951), quoted in 
Lastowka, supra note 5, at 1. 
122
 See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 160. Trademark doctrine also holds that context can 
make proper source attribution clear; explicit disclaimers are not required in order for 
parodies to be nonconfusing and noninfringing. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Publ'g. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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of the parody, we merely insist that the audience be aware that 
underlying the parody there is an original and separate expression, 
attributable to a different artist. This awareness may come from the fact 
that the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some 
manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the parody.123 
 
As I have written elsewhere, if I say that life is “a tale/Told by an idiot, full of 
sound and fury,/Signifying nothing,” I hardly expect readers to think the words are 
mine,124 and only a law review would require a citation. So, when the author of a 
popular series of humorous movie summaries decried plagiarism, she concluded 
her denunciation with “Do not post it in a box, do not post it on a fox. I do not like 
creative theft and ham, I do not like it, Jerk I Am.”125 Then she added a footnote 
instructing critics not to accuse her of plagiarism because “you know damn well 
what this is from.”126  
Perhaps Lastowka’s requirement of reasonable attribution would include 
attribution that is obvious because of the popularity of the infringed work, but it is 
hard to imagine copyright plaintiffs conceding that. A fifth fair use factor could 
easily give them new ammunition to argue that a defendant’s attribution was too 
limited and the use therefore unfair. Fourteen years after Koons lost Rogers v. 
Koons, he won a similar fair use case involving uncredited appropriation of a not 
particularly recognizable fashion photograph, which he combined with other 
images to comment on the pleasures and dangers of our consumption-oriented 
society.127 The Second Circuit’s analysis this time did not mention credit, focusing 
instead on the transformative nature of the use. Under Lastowka’s proposal, 
Koons’s use would have had an additional strike against it, despite the relative 
unimportance of the sources of his borrowed images to his message.  
Fair use is already uncertain enough for defendants, and a new variable is 
likely to worsen matters. Instead, fair use should treat attribution flexibly, taking it 
into account where appropriate. The current test allows for that already and is not 
in need of revision. There may, however, be cases in which new user rights can be 
coupled with attribution requirements in a productive manner. 
                                                 
123
 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), quoted in 
Lastowka, supra note 5, at 52. 
124
 See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 155; see also RANDALL, supra note 40, at 5; Posting 
of Geoffrey K. Pullum, Language Log: Plagiarism and Allusion, (June 12, 2007, 20:16), 
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004598.html (“It’s plagiarism if you 
copy someone’s writing and you don’t want it to be noticed that you were copying; it’s 
allusion if you do exactly the same but you do want it to be noticed. . . . [In making an 
uncredited allusion,] I intended there to be not just recognition of the quote but also mutual 
recognition of our mutual knowledge state.”).  
125
 Movies in Fifteen Minutes, http://community.livejournal.com/ m15m/4155.html 
(July 1, 2004, 13:17:00 EST). 
126
 Id. 
127
 See Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006).  
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B.  The Paternity of Orphan Works 
 
Orphan works offer another area of possible legislative reform. In this case, 
there is substantial momentum for change, and attribution will likely be part of a 
solution. The Copyright Office’s proposal mentioned above has set the terms for 
further debate. It provides that if a user made a reasonable search for the copyright 
owner but failed to locate her, and if the user provided attribution to the author and 
the copyright owner “if such attribution is possible and as is reasonably appropriate 
under the circumstances,” then significant limitations on remedies would apply in 
the unlikely event that the copyright owner later resurfaced.128 The Copyright 
Office concluded that attribution would facilitate notice to the copyright owner that 
her work was being used and deter abuse of the orphan works protection, and that 
attribution is independently valuable to authors even when their works are used 
without consent.129 
I am in favor of orphan works legislation, but the Copyright Office’s proposal 
with respect to attribution should be modified. Attribution alone is too subtle a 
signal if the desire is to encourage copyright owners to come forward. Moreover, 
as noted above and as Kwall argues, attribution in the context of derivative works 
may give the appearance of consent, which may be mistaken and even deeply 
offensive to an author. If it is possible and appropriate to give attribution, it is also 
possible and appropriate to state that the work is being used as an orphan work.130 
This is not to say that such a designation will always be helpful—it may rarely be 
                                                 
128
 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 19, at 110. The Office’s proposed 
statutory language incorporates this language, which is designed to be flexible. See id. at 
127. The Orphan Works Act of 2006, legislation introduced by Representative Lamar 
Smith, used similar language requiring attribution, “in a manner reasonable under the 
circumstances, to the author and owner of the copyright, if known with a reasonable degree 
of certainty based on information obtained in performing the [required] reasonably diligent 
search.” H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. § 514(a)(1)(B) (2006), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439:. 
129
 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 19, at 111–12. 
130
 The reply comments of the Association of American Publishers (AAP) provide an 
objection to my proposal: The AAP points out that copyright law generally does not require 
attribution, nor does it require users to identify the particular exceptions they are relying on 
when they proceed without the copyright owner’s consent. Joint Reply Comments 
Concerning “Orphan Works” from the AAP to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Pol’y & 
Internal Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office 6 (May 6, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/ 
orphan/comments/reply/OWR0085-AAP-AAUP-SIIA.pdf. That is not a huge problem, but 
the AAP points out that an orphan-works designation might itself be misleading. See id; cf. 
id. at 4 (expressing a concern that “orphan work” not become a status that applies to a work 
for all time, but rather a designation that applies to a particular use of a work because that 
specific user’s search was reasonable, but failed). The question is, as always, the balance of 
harms; if, as almost everyone agrees, “parents” essentially never show up to reclaim their 
orphans, any cost of an explicit designation would be minimal—though perhaps the 
benefit, too, would be limited, as unknown and unfindable authors/owners would almost 
never be harmed by false assumptions that they had authorized a particular use. 
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noticed, much less understood by nonexpert audiences. Yet an explicit designation 
of orphan work status would be a relatively low-cost way of signaling lack of 
consent, in the context of a special protection that already requires users to jump 
through various hoops and include attribution information.131 
The orphan works proceedings also offer insight into the ways in which 
attribution rights are deeply linked to author-centered concepts of copyright and to 
integrity rights. The Copyright Office’s report repeatedly emphasizes that the 
copyright in orphan works is often held by entities other than the individual 
creators, which is part of what makes the problem so difficult for would-be 
users.132 In response to this observation, the Directors Guild of America suggested 
that film directors, who generally are not authors but rather participants in the 
creation of works for hire, be given backup rights to authorize uses of orphan 
works when the copyright owner cannot be found.133 The Copyright Office 
rejected this proposal,134 but its own proposal to require attribution to both author 
and copyright owner, despite the fact that only the copyright owner has an 
economic interest in being notified of the use,135 indicates the kinship between 
attribution rights and other author-centered rights. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION: AUTHORS’ RIGHTS IN AN OWNERSHIP SOCIETY 
 
There are powerful arguments that American copyright law should be 
rebalanced to give more weight to the interests of authors of creative works, rather 
than the owners of the economic rights in those works. Attribution rights could be 
a part of a package of authorial rights. On their own, however, they are too alien to 
our copyright law to work well with the rest of the system, especially given the 
complexities of credit in context.  
I have identified three types of proponents of attribution rights. Authorial 
high-protectionists seek recognition for the natural rights of creators and their 
                                                 
131
 Labeling can have epistemic value as a practice even if labels’ specific contents 
are widely ignored. Knowing that labels exist, in other words, has value in assuring 
audiences that they can trust what they see independent of knowing what the labels say. Cf. 
Goodman, supra note 99 (arguing for the merits of a system in which audiences can 
generally trust speakers). Attribution may also have specific value to certain practice 
communities that regularly reuse existing work, such as fan fiction writers and fan video 
creators or documentary filmmakers, as part of their self-definitions. See Tushnet, supra 
note 11, at 154–60. But these epistemic values do not justify a legal attribution right, which 
exists largely to correct mistakes or malfeasance in labels that are, in fact, generally present 
and thus already conferring their epistemic benefits as signifiers that a citation of a prior 
work has occurred or that a particular person claims authorship. 
132
 See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 19, passim. 
133
 See id. at 107 n.365 (proposal of Directors Guild of America). 
134
 See id. (“[The proposal] go[es] well beyond the scope of this study, and touch[es] 
upon fundamental issues about how rights and interests in the exploitation of motion 
pictures are apportioned.”). 
135
 See id. at 111 (“Attribution will help facilitate the marketplace transactions that are 
the primary goal of the recommended solution to the orphan works problem.”). 
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special connections to their works. Copyright law-protectionists favor credit 
instead of control of downstream uses of copyrighted works. Trademark-style 
consumer protectionists consider authorship relevant information for audiences to 
consider. Each set of justifications is directed at different goals and each has 
somewhat different responses to the problems I have identified. Often, these 
justifications may even be in tension with one another, compounding the 
uncertainties involved in framing a legally enforceable attribution right. In the 
actual legislative process, powerful corporate interests, who have reason to be 
hostile to the claims of individual authors, would also influence the drafting of an 
attribution right, and it is unlikely that many of those who support attribution rights 
in the abstract would be happy with the result. 
Attribution remains a powerful incentive for creative production. Moreover, 
norms of credit, including the ones that produced all the footnotes in this piece, are 
extremely valuable for particular professions and individuals laboring within those 
professions. Sometimes, however, law and morality should be left to diverge, when 
law’s tools are too crude to make the fine distinctions that prevail in ethics. 
Attribution rights provide an example of this situation. “Who steals my purse steals 
trash,”136 but should still go to jail; but he that filches from me credit for my 
creative works deserves condemnation, not injunction. 
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 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 3, sc. 3. 
